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Although Bolivia's next presidential election is still two years away, the opposition is already
focused on it, with all that implies in countries like this one in the South American altiplano, where
party, personal, business, and even racial interests carry more weight than concern for the nation. In
recent weeks, the leadership of parties in opposition to President Evo Morales began negotiations to
create an electoral front to be able to go into the December 2014 elections with a chance of defeating
the president.
Despite the meeting being called by white, racist groups allied with the secessionist interests of
the rich eastern region of the country, what those groups are most interested in is winning over a
segment of the indigenous population. In a country with an indigenous majority, no project with a
democratic façade could survive without at least minimal indigenous representation.
"This will be the longest and most contentious campaign in the history of the country. The intensity
of the debate and depth of the conflicts among the contenders point to an increasingly antagonistic
evolution of the campaign. We are looking at two years and four months in which the electoral costbenefit of political logic will be imposed in defining the agendas of the political, union, institutional,
and citizen actors," wrote Ricardo Paz Ballivian, an analyst with the La Paz daily La Razón, on Aug.
13. And he was not wrong. The Bolivian reality is indeed contentious.

Opposition copies unsuccessful Venezuelan model
The opposition is using the Venezuelan model, in which, after 13 years of fighting separately
against the government of President Hugo Chávez, opposition groups formed the Mesa de Unidad
Democrático (MUD) and held a primary to choose a candidate, Henrique Capriles, to represent
them in the presidential election (NotiSur, Feb. 24, 2012). The effort failed, because the MUD
believed that "all against Chávez" was the key to ending the Revolución Bolivariana, forgetting that
without a governing plan it could not convince the people to vote for its candidate.
In their efforts to create an alliance similar to the MUD, proponents insist on using the good and the
bad of what the Venezuelans did: they propose that the leadership come from an internal election
among all parties and sectors of the opposition spectrum; and they say that, without an agreed-upon
platform, which "should be finished by mid-2013," they cannot compete against Morales and his
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).
However, along with imitating what is good in the Caribbean model, both those who came up
with the idea of a broad-based opposition front as well as potential members—including some
indigenous groups that have distanced themselves from the MAS—fell into the "all against
Morales" position as the way to go. With that vision, they have only managed to deepen the existing
divisions in society.
The first proposal to form a "unity table" was announced by Samuel Doria Medina, leader of
the Unión Nacional (UN), a rightist party that, with Doria Medina as its candidate in the 2009
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 3

LADB Article Id: 78838
ISSN: 1060-4189

presidential election, came in third, with 5.65% of the vote, compared with Morales' 64.22% (NotiSur,
Sept. 4, 2009). Doria Medina, a powerful cement magnate and owner of the Bolivian Burger King
franchise, was accompanied by rightist Amílcar Barral, who has a degree in marketing and heads the
Nueva Alianza Boliviana (NAB), a group without parliamentary representation.
On Nov. 13, Doria Medina and Barral publically presented the Frente de Unidad por la Democracia
and said that, "although we are aware that ample ideological differences persist" among those who
share only a rejection of Morales, they were calling on the entire political-opposition spectrum to
"delineate a programmatic agreement" and designate "through democratic mechanisms [a primary]
one candidate to represent us in the 2014 presidential election."

Little positive response from other groups
For now, most opposition parties have responded with silence, but "that is not to say that behind
closed doors they are not analyzing Doria Medina's idea, so the still unborn Frente de Unidad por
la Democracia could be a good way to sweep up the entire electorate so that in 2014 not one vote of
hatred for Morales escapes," said sociologist Alfonso Solís when questioned by the news agency
ANSA.
The only group that responded was the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM)—the major opposition
force since it broke with Morales shortly after the 2009 election—and it did so only to say that
its differences with the UN make a political alliance impossible. When MSM leader Juan del
Granado, a former mayor of La Paz, explained to the press the reasons for the negative response,
he did so expressing opposition more to Morales than to Doria Medina, a man who is his polar
opposite politically and who has a shady past with multiple corruption convictions, which bar
him from holding public positions, from running for elective office, and from leaving the country
without court authorization. Del Granado said that the MSM "opposes the MAS's personalist and
authoritarian vision but also the opportunistic vision of conservative sectors that want to form unity
fronts only to win elections any way possible."
Differences within the opposition became clear when it was unable to present a unity candidate for
the upcoming January elections in Beni department, which will elect a governor for the next five
years. Doria Medina and Barral had also proposed selecting a unity candidate for the Beni election.
In the end, three opposition candidates—among them indigenous Deputy Pedro Nuny—will face off
against Jessica Jordán, a former beauty queen who will represent MAS.
While efforts with the MSM did not initially bear fruit, other indigenous leaders, such as Nuny and
Fernando Vargas—who, in alliance with the secessionist right of the eastern department of Santa
Cruz, led the opposition to Morales in that region—are open to proposals, even overlooking the
exacerbated racism of many of the groups that could make up an opposition front.

Opposition unable to block MAS attorney general candidate
The first signs that indigenous groups were willing to align with the right to act against the
indigenous Morales government appeared a month before Doria Medina and Barral proposed a
unified opposition. On Oct. 3, two indigenous legislators elected to represent MAS in the lower
house voted with the opposition to block the suspension of Deputy Adriana Gil, a young woman
from Santa Cruz who represents the ultraright Convergencia Nacional (CN). The motion to suspend
Gil was because of her racist expressions against the president, whom she always refers to as "the
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Indian." Seventy-seven votes were required to sanction Gil, two-thirds of those present, but the
motion was defeated by a 75 to 41 vote. "I thank the indigenous bloc of MAS; this proves that we
can work together for Bolivia," said Gil after the vote was taken.
Felipe Dorado, another CN deputy, went even further and proposed that Del Granado's MSM and
Doria Medina's UN form "a unified bloc to allow us to put an end to the two-thirds government."
Two-thirds is the majority needed to make "special decisions."
The litmus test for a "unified bloc" was the legislative election for the new Fiscal General del Estado,
a key post in the country's legal structure. Dorado's hopes were soon dashed. On Nov. 20, when his
proposal and that of Doria Medina and Barral were still fresh, the Asamblea Nacional (AN) quickly
voted on the attorney general post. With 144 of the AN's members present—36 senators and 130
deputies—MAS was able to pull together 105 votes to elect Ramiro Guerrero, a prestigious jurist
who was among the framers of the new Constitución Plurinacional. The opposition complained
of "errors" in the election process. Morales responded saying that it was a "formidable setback to
neoliberalism and the racists."
The dailies La Razón and Página Siete wrote that, despite the discouragement caused by the
designation of the new attorney general, opposition groups—including those of Del Granado, Nuny,
and Vargas—continue discussing forming a front. However, neither Guerrero's election nor the
latest polls give them reason to push the idea. In Bolivia, perhaps the only South American country
with reliable polls, society continues to favor the MAS government.
A survey by the private Ipsos consulting firm, published Nov. 26 by opposition Santa Cruz daily El
Deber, showed that, in the last six months, Morales' approval rating has risen by 11 points to 59%.
The numbers are similar to those compiled in a private study by Página Siete, although slightly
lower than the results of a survey by AmericasBarometro of the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP), an initiative of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. The LAPOP study
gave the Morales administration an approval rating of 64.2%, the same percentage with which
Morales won the 2009 election (NotiSur, Dec. 18, 2009).
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